The paper explores how legal change affects lending behavior of banks in twelve transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to previous studies, we use bank level rather than aggregate data, which allows us to control for country level heterogeneity and analyze the effect of legal change on different types of lenders. Using a differences-in-differences methodology to analyze the within country variation of changes in creditor rights protection, we find that the credit supplied by banks increases subsequent to legal change. Further, we show that collateral law matters more for credit market development than bankruptcy law. We also show that entrants respond more strongly to legal change than incumbents. In particular, foreign-owned banks extend their lending volume substantially more than do domestic banks, be they private or state owned. The same holds when we use foreign greenfield banks as proxies for new entrants. These results are robust after controlling for a wide variety of possibilities.
Introduction
The paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, henceforth LLSV) titled 'Law and Finance' and subsequent literature (Levine 1998 (Levine , 1999 Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007) has linked creditor rights with financial development by documenting positive correlations between creditor rights and size of credit markets in cross-country regressions. 1 The major function attributed to law is that it empowers creditors to enforce their contracts. The suggested mechanism through which law affects financial development is by reducing the cost of external finance.
There is, however, scant attention paid to understanding the channel through which changes in legal institutions get transmitted to the economy. How do improvements of creditor rights get transmitted to the economy? Which laws matter more? Do laws affect all market participants in the same manner? A good and thorough understanding of these questions is essential if one has to incorporate creditor rights into broader discussions on policy. This paper attempts to further the scholarship on law and finance by investigating these issues.
We exploit variation in legal institutions of twelve transition economies and employ a research design that is commonly referred to as the 'quasi-natural experiment' approach.
Using a differences-in-differences methodology (DID henceforth), we find that law does in fact promote lending. The overall level of formal creditor rights protection is positively associated with the lending volume, and so is legal change with increases in lending volume over time.
A critical issue that is mostly ignored is what kind of creditor protection lenders are reasonably looking for. The existent empirical literature uses devices that protect creditors in bankruptcy, overlooking components that pertain to collateral laws. The LLSV index, the most widely used index in the 'Law and Finance' literature, consists of four legal indicators: secured creditors first; management out; no automatic stay on assets; and creditor consent for re-organization. These indicators primarily protect creditors from competing claims by other creditors and not against a defaulting debtor. We therefore investigate which components of creditor rights are crucial for credit supply. Specifically, we differentiate between legal rules designed to protect individual creditors' claims outside bankruptcy (Collateral) and the collective enforcement regime bankruptcy establishes (Bankruptcy).
From a theoretical perspective, it is a priori not clear whether bankruptcy or collateral law is more important for credit supply decisions of banks in emerging and transition economies. Several scholars have postulated that collective enforcement problems arising from coordination failures are a key impediment to financing especially in emerging and transition economies thus underscoring the importance of bankruptcy design (see for example Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1992 , Gertner and Scharfstein 1991 , and Berkovitch and Israel 1999 .
There is also a fairly large literature that documents the disciplining role of debt finance (Townsend 1979 , Gale and Hellwig 1984 , Diamond 1984 , Bolton and Scharfstein 1990 , 1996 , Hart and Moore 1994, and several others) which comes from the liquidation threat that accompanies debt contracts. Of course, the threat of liquidation is governed by the collection rights that are accorded by the existing collateral laws. Further, it is natural to expect that the relevance of bankruptcy law depends on the existence and scope of collateral rules in a legal system. Putting it differently, the existence of a collateral law is a precondition for the effectiveness of the bankruptcy regime. The relative importance of these laws (and their interactions) for lending, thus, remains an empirical question.
We find Collateral to be more important than Bankruptcy. This result is in contrast to previous papers, in which measures related to collective enforcement/reorganization (LLSV index) were used to proxy for creditor rights. Further, we find that effectiveness of a bankruptcy regime is conditional on the existing collateral regime, i.e. the existence of a strong collateral regime is critical for the efficacy of the bankruptcy regime.
Finally, our data suggests that entrants to the market, and in particular foreign banks, respond more strongly to legal change than incumbents by increasing their lending volume.
The same is true when comparing greenfield banks with incumbents. The main intuition for this result comes from the notion that domestic banks have an informational advantage over foreign banks, that may find it difficult to break into the existing relational networks (see for example Buch 2003) . Specifically, they lack the information and cultural know how to effectively compete with domestic players. The strengthening of formal creditor rights protection may reduce these cultural and informational barriers to market entry and therefore benefit foreign players in particular. Moreover, if, as suggested in some of the literature (Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001 , Khanna and Palepu 2000 , Giannetti and Ongena 2007 , 2008 , Brown and Maurer 2005 , and Mian 2006 , foreign banks are indeed more efficient lenders in emerging markets than domestic banks, strengthening creditor rights should help foreign banks take full advantage of their greater expertise, as legal protections may offer a substitute for cultural and local knowledge. 2 There are several hurdles that hinder empirical research in this area. The first and foremost concern is related to the endogenous nature of legal institutions. The general problem is that legal variables are very sticky as institutions hardly change. Most of the existing research, therefore, relies on cross-sectional studies that relate differences in legal institutions to various economic parameters. It may be clear, though, countries that differ in their legal framework also differ in other dimensions, both observed and unobserved. Thus, comparing countries with good legal institutions to those with bad legal institutions may capture the effect of omitted variables or unobserved differences. Second, most of prior research uses macro level indicators, such as the size of credit markets as a share of GDP. The use of these aggregate outcome measures, even though extremely insightful, puts enormous constraints on the set of questions that can be explored.
We overcome these problems by focusing our study on twelve Central Eastern European (CEE) transition economies and assembling a unique matched database comprising bank level information, ownership information, and time series information of legal changes for these countries. There are several advantages of using this set of countries as a laboratory: 1) these countries have undergone major legal reforms in the 1990s, 2) these countries 2 Sengupta (forthcoming) develops a formal model that captures the intuition of these findings.
form a fairly homogeneous group, 3) there is a considerable inter-temporal variation in the timing of these reforms, 4) the reforms are motivated by pressures from outside governing bodies such as the European Union (EU) 3 , European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and USAID, and 5) these are all bank-based economies, therefore, creditor rights should play an important role in these countries. 4 There are several broad implications of our results. First, our paper illustrates the causal nexus between law and lending. Elaborating further, strengthening of creditor rights facilitates credit supplied in the economy by increasing lenders' willingness to attract capital. Further, the results of our paper suggest that foreign banks benefit more from changes in legal institution when compared to domestic banks. This finding is consistent with the economic argument that legal institutions help reduce the information gap between borrowers and lenders. Thus, protecting creditor rights also stimulates the attraction of foreign capital.
Furthermore, and more important, the empirical results of our paper indicate that the ability to pledge assets seems to be an important determinant of credit supplied in the economy. The collateral variable, however, has been vastly ignored in prior empirical work. This paper suggests that it plays an important role, especially in emerging and transition economies where information asymmetries tend to be of a greater concern compared to developed markets. Finally, our study documents that the existence of a good collateral regime is essential for the effectiveness of the bankruptcy regime.
Data and legal reforms
In this section we provide detailed information on the legal reforms that constitute the event in our analysis as well as information on the data set that we have employed.
3 Most CEE countries were seeking EU membership and there were strict guidelines which these countries had to adhere to. 4 A drawback of using transition economies as a laboratory is that other events (institutional changes) could confound our empirical analysis. We address these concerns in Section 5.
The event: creditor rights reforms in Eastern Europe
Our sample consists of the ten new Eastern European EU members countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) together with Croatia and Ukraine. At the outset of legal reforms these former socialist countries had their level of shareholder and creditor protection well below world average (Pistor 2000) . In an attempt to reform these laws, the EBRD established the secured transactions project, that culminated in the formation of the so-called model law (Dahan 2000) . The model law served as a template from which the national legislation of transition economies was drafted. 5 According the EBRD:
'The model law is intended to form a basis from which national legislation for transition countries can be developed, [...] , indicating through a detailed legal text how the principal components of a secured transactions law can be drafted (EBRD 2000) .'
The model law together with some elements of American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) were used in a number of reform projects throughout the region to induce and shape reforms.
The detailed information on the reforms, collected through several interviews with individuals members involved in the reforms, is summarized in Table IV . With Estonia being an exception, all observed reforms were accompanied by foreign donors as well as foreign contractors. These reforms of creditor rights constitute the event for our subsequent analysis.
We begin by coding the statutory legal changes for our sample countries, distinguishing between the individual creditor rights regime that is related to the ability of pledge assets (Collateral) from the collective enforcement regime (Bankruptcy). Earlier data of the underlying legal indicators was drawn from Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 2000 while information on additional indicators for the period after 1998 was hand collected from statutory law books of our sample countries. For Collateral we first code the possibility to secure land by way of establishing a mortgage that would be recorded in local land or court registries. 6 Introducing an effective collateral regime for security interests in movable assets (personal property) expands the scope of assets a creditor may secure in return for a loan. The critical issue is not whether a country allows that movable assets may be secured -all countries did this early on in the transition process. Instead it is, whether they recognize non-possessory security interests (collateral) in movable assets. To capture this, we code two additional indicators. First, whether a country's law recognizes that a legally valid security interest can be established without transferring possession of this asset to the lender. And second, whether a country has a system in place for the registration of such security interests. The first of the two variables notes the existence of a non-possessory charge, the second checks for the verifiability of a charge. This is crucial, because an asset may be secured more than once. The registry of security interests allows creditors to establish their priority vis-à-vis other creditors. The cumulative index Collateral is the sum of the three sub-indicators. Table II. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that suggests that these legal reforms had significant effects on economic outcomes. Some expected benefits of these reforms that were mentioned in the popular press included lowering of interest rates derived from an improvement in lenders' willingness to supply capital (see appendix A for a selection of business press articles related to our event). To further illustrate the impact of these reforms, we hand collected data on the frequency of credit registries usage by banks brought about by changes in the collateral law. This information is obtained from the respective ministries of finance of our sample countries as well as the EBRD and is summarized in Table V There is also some recent and more scientific evidence that suggests that law had significant real effects. Haselmann and Vig (2008) analyze the effect of these reforms on the composition of aggregate financing in a sample of transition economies. They find that strengthening of creditor rights resulted in an increase in lending to both individuals (households) as well as firms while lending to the government sector remains unaffected. Further, the impact of legal change on individual lending is larger in magnitude as compared to the impact on enterprise lending (see Table B I in appendix B). 7 One plausible economic rationale for this is that with strong creditor rights, banks are more comfortable in lending to informationally opaque households that were rationed in the older regime. They also examine the effect of creditor rights change on firms' debt as well as on firms' leverage. Using firm level data from the Bureau van Dyck Amadeus database, they find that improvements in creditor rights are associated with more firm debt and more leverage. This is consistent with what scholars have found in related studies (e.g. Giannetti 2003) . Finally, they find that small firms received more external debt following legal change as compared to large firms (see Table B II in appendix B).
Bank level data
In order to gain insights about the behavior of banks in our sample countries, we construct an extensive database that contains detailed information on accounting and ownership variables of these banks. The accounting information is obtained from Bureau van Dyck Bankscope database, which covers banks controlling at least 85 percent of the banking assets in each nation. We use consolidated unless consolidated statements are not reported by Bankscope in which case we use unconsolidated statements. change Furthermore, we only report commercial banks, since non-commercial banks operate under a different set of constraints. In particular, we exclude national banks, trade banks, agricultural banks, cooperative banks, development banks, automotive banks, and investment banks since these banks may have different objectives. We collect annual data of financial information for banks in our sample countries from 1995 throughout 2002. Overall we have 1874 bank year observations from 323 banks available and our sample runs from 1995 to 2002.
An important variable of this study is the time-series information on the ownership of banks, specifically whether a bank is foreign or domestically owned. This information is hand collected from central bank reports, annual reports of the banks and from the individual web pages of each of these banks. A bank is defined as foreign owned if foreigners or foreign entities own 50 percent or more of its assets. In addition, a bank is considered foreign if it is a subsidiary of a domestic bank that is itself owned by foreigners. In addition, we hand collected details about the merger and acquisition activities of all banks in our sample. The detailed information on the variables used is provided in Table I . Table III presents descriptive statistics of these indicators divided into ownership categories. These ownership categories encompass foreign and domestic banks. Foreign banks are further divided into those that enter the market by taking over a domestic bank (takeover) and those that founded a new bank (greenfield). On average, foreign banks are slightly bigger in terms of assets and total loans. The foreign take-over banks are more than three times larger than the greenfield banks. Domestic banks are divided into government and privately owned banks. Domestic government owned banks are clearly bigger than domestic private banks. These differences are less pronounced in the equity to asset, loan to asset, profit to asset and liquidity ratios. Domestic private banks have the highest solvency ratio. Finally, our macro indicators are gathered from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Empirical analysis
We apply a differences-in-differences approach. Using bank-level data, we test the following specification.
where i indexes banks, 8 j indexes countries and t indexes year. The logarithm of loans is denoted as y it . The year fixed effects and the bank fixed effects are given respectively by α t and α i . The set of control variables is referred to as X it . Bank specific control variables are the logarithm of assets as well as the solvency and liquidity ratio. In order to control for the macroeconomic environment a bank operates in, we include the lending and deposit rate, GDP, inflation rate, measures for the size and concentration of the credit markets, as well as the market share of each bank. CreditorRights jt−1 is our legal variable as described in the previous section. Our variable of interest is δ. It captures the sensitivity of the dependent variable to the legal change. We use block bootstrapped robust clustered standard errors as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) . 9 Table I provides definitions and sources of all variables included in the subsequent regressions.
A similar research design has been used in several studies, particularly in labor economics, of which Card and Krueger (1994) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) are some notable examples. The multiple pre-intervention and post-intervention time periods take care of many threats concerning validity. This methodology is best illustrated by the following example. 10 Suppose we have two countries, A and B, undergoing legal changes at times t=1 and t=2, respectively. Consider t=0 to be the starting period in our sample. From t=1 to t=2, country B initially serves as a control group for legal change and after that serves as a treated group for subsequent years. Therefore, most countries belong to both treated and control groups at different points in time. This specification is robust to the fact that some groups might not be treated at all, or other groups that were treated prior to 1995, which is our sample's beginning date.
For the DID approach to be meaningful, two aspects need to be accounted for. First, a similarity between comparison groups is desirable. Meyer (1995) has emphasized the importance of group similarity in research while suggesting that 'for a given degree of similarity within the treatment group, however, greater differences across comparison groups are desirable if they are likely to lead to different biases.' Second, the change in creditor rights should be exogenous.
The first issue surrounding similar comparison groups has little effect on our analysis since our sample consists of CEE economies, which are similar along several critical dimensions. All countries in our sample share the legacy of socialism and introduced substantial economic reforms in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the pooling of data from different countries is helpful if each country has a different bias.
issue again later but would like to stress at this point that endogeneity is less of a concern for us since we only look at bank level outcomes while legal change is at the country level.
An individual bank does not have the luxury to opt in or opt out of the market. 12
Results
In this section we present the results of our empirical analysis. In the first subsection we report the effect of legal change on the credit supplied by banks. In the second subsection we investigate whether law has separate effects on different players, in particular on incumbents vs. new entrants. We conclude by discussing the response of multinational banks to improvements in creditor rights.
Legal change and loan supply
We begin by running specification 1. Table VI reports the relevance of the Creditor Rights variable. As can be seen in column 1, the coefficient on the legal variable is positive and highly significant. In column 2 we use bank level controls used in previous research. The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the residual variance, thereby increasing the efficiency of the results. Including these variables does not change our results and in many cases strengthens them. However, because of the possibility of these variables endogenously affecting the dependent variable, we consistently present regressions with and without these controls. The economic impact of a legal change on bank lending is considerable. Even after controlling for bank and macro control variables, an improvement of our legal indicator by one implies an increase of loan supply by 13.66 percent. 13 The above specification does not control for country specific time-varying shocks. In order to fully account for such shocks, the inclusion of interacted year and country dummies (α t * α j ) would be required. These dummies, however, would fully absorb the variation of our legal indicator. In order to address this issue, we follow the methodology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) . Instead of including a whole set of α t * α j dummies, we include the mean value of the dependent variable of each country and each year excluding each respective bank i itself, denoted as Loans jt(−i) . As presented in Table VI , columns 3/4, this leaves our results unchanged.
As mentioned earlier, the political process and the external pressures that led to the adoptions of these reforms should allay most concerns of endogeneity. To further address reverse causality issues we study the dynamic effects of creditor rights change on banks' loan supply in greater detail. In Table VI , columns 5/6, we replace the Creditor Rights indicator with four variables: Before 1 takes the value of Creditor Rights one period before the actual legal change took place, Before 0 takes the value of Creditor Rights in the actual period, After 1 takes the value of Creditor Rights of the last year, and After 2 equals the value of Creditor Rights of two years ago. The variable Before 1 allows us to assess whether any loan supply effect can be found prior to the improvement in creditor rights. Finding such an 'effect' of the legislation prior to its introduction could be symptomatic of some reverse causation. In fact, the estimated coefficient on Before 1 is economically and statistically insignificant. 14 Consequently, the legal changes in this sample have not been anticipated.
This assuages any remaining concerns of biases driven by endogeneity.
We now disaggregate the general measure for creditor rights protection into its two components, Collateral and Bankruptcy. Collateral measures whether creditors can use security interests in assets to protect their loans. Collateral protects an individual creditor against default even before a debtor enters bankruptcy. By contrast, Bankruptcy creates a collective enforcement regime once a debtor has become insolvent and specifies which creditors have priority over others. In Table VI , columns 7/8, we run a horse race between Bankruptcy and Collateral by including both legal variables together in specification 1. Results show that collateral law seems to have a statistically significant effect on bank lending, while improvements in bankruptcy legislation have not. These results demonstrate the importance of laws relating to pledgeability of assets as a driver of credit supply thus underscoring the importance of collateral law. 15 Our results show that it is collateral law that turns out to be stronger, at least for emerging/transition economies.
It is quite natural to expect that effectiveness of the bankruptcy regime is a function of the underlying collateral regime. To test this, we divide the sample based on the level of our Collateral variable at the time the bankruptcy reform was done i.e. we classify whether
Collateral was 'good' or 'bad' (meaning whether Collateral was above or below the mean), and see the effect of a change in the Bankruptcy variable on subsequent lending by banks. It can be seen from Table VI that the effect of bankruptcy law on lending is indeed positive for those countries that had a good collateral regime at the time of passage of the bankruptcy law.
However, there is no effect on lending subsequent to a bankruptcy law change in countries that had a 'bad' collateral regime. Thus, the presence of a good collateral regime seems to be prerequisite for the effectiveness of the bankruptcy regime. Interestingly, the effect of a change in collateral regime on lending is positive and significant irrespective of the quality of the prevailing bankruptcy regimes. 16
Incumbents versus entrants
We further try to answer in this paper whether formal legal change affects different types of lenders in different ways. One would expect that foreign players are more receptive to legal change than domestic players since as entrants to the domestic markets they benefit from the creation of a level playing field. This is consistent with the claim by Buch (2003) , who suggests that foreign players might be disadvantaged due to cultural constraints. Benefiting from formal legal protection may allow foreign banks to fully optimize their comparative lending advantage (Khanna and Palepu 2000). 17
15 The creditor rights variable (LLSV index) used in most of the empirical literature is primarily a bankruptcy variable. 16 The magnitudes are slightly lower when the existing bankruptcy regime at the time of the collateral law change is 'bad'. We define a 'good'/'bad' bankruptcy regime if Bankruptcy was above/below the mean.
17 Qian and Strahan (2007) find that foreign banks are more likely to join a loan syndicate in countries with a higher quality of creditor rights protection.
The specification for this test is the following
where all variables and subscripts are defined as in specification 1. The dummy variable
Foreign it takes the value of one if a bank is majority foreign owned and zero otherwise. Our variable of interest is δ, which measures the sensitivity to the interaction of the legal change and foreign ownership dummy. Our results as presented in Table VII , columns 1 to 3, suggest that foreign banks indeed increase their lending volume in response to legal change more than domestic banks. This is illustrated by the positive interaction coefficient of our legal variable with the foreign ownership dummy (Foreign). Since bank ownership varies over the sample period specification 3 also allows for the inclusion of interacted country and year dummies (α j * α t ), eliminating all shocks specific to each country in a given year.
Results are robust to this test (columns 2/3).
So far, we have treated foreign banks as entrants and domestic banks as incumbents.
In fact, many banks that became foreign owned banks were domestic private or state owned banks prior to the ownership change. To further investigate our proposition that law benefits primarily entrants over incumbents, we reclassify entrants and incumbents. We compare greenfield foreign owned banks (Green) with all other banks (see Table VII , columns 4 to 6). The results are similar to that of foreign vs. domestic banks but the significance is somewhat lower.
Supply vs. demand
The focus of the paper has been on the supply side of lending. Put differently, we started with the hypothesis that strengthening of creditor rights increases banks' willingness to lend. A counter argument could be that the increase in credit supply is driven by demand instead. It could be the case that the passage of the law had simply coincided with improved investment opportunities in the country. 18 While this demand driven story is a plausible story, we note that the inclusion of economy wide parameters, such as per capita GDP and stock market growth, leaves our results unaffected. Finally, the credit to GDP ratios in the CEE countries under consideration imply that these markets are undercapitalized. This suggests the presence of credit rationing, meaning that loan demand exceeds loan supply in the CEE markets. Our estimation procedure therefore captures the supply effect.
To further strengthen our claim, we exploit a unique feature of our dataset. Our sample includes 27 multinational banks that operated in at least two different countries at the same point in time. We exploit this feature to test whether multinational banks' allocation of credit responds to legal change. This constitutes a test for the effect of law on banks' lending behavior by focusing on within multinational bank variation in the data.
An example illustrates the intuition behind this test. A bank supplies a certain amount of loans via different subsidiaries in country A and country B at t = 0. Further, country
A has a legal change between t = 0 and t = 1, while country B has none. Comparing the difference in loan supply at t = 1 and t = 0 between both subsidiaries allows us to measure the impact of the legislative change within the same banking institution. In order to control for investment opportunities, we benchmark this to credit supplied by the other banks in their respective markets. As long as these unobserved/omitted variables affect both multinational and other banks they get differenced out.
The specification for this test is as follows
where s indexes subsidiaries, k indexes multinational banks, j indexes countries, and t indexes year. The level of loans for each subsidiary at each point in time is denoted as y st . We control for bank fixed effects, country of operation fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Creditor Rights jt−1 is the legal variable defined above. Our variable of interest is δ 18 For instance enterprise privatization is likely to be associated with a high capital demand.
which measures the sensitivity to the legal change. As presented in Table VIII , columns 1/2, Creditor Rights is significant. In columns 3/4 we include Loans jt(−i) , which is the mean value of the loans of each country and each year (excluding each respective bank i itself) in specification 3. Our results remain unaffected.
We also examine the components of creditor rights that are critical for multinational banks. In columns 5/6 we split the Creditor Rights indicator into its components. Again we find a strong positive effect of Collateral on multinational banks' lending decision. Regarding Bankruptcy, the respective coefficient is smaller in magnitude and only marginal significant as long as bank and macro specific control variables are left out of the specification.
Further tests
We now address some sample-related concerns. 19 The sample used is unbalanced, as it includes banks that have entered the market during the sample period and banks that ceased to exist, due to take-over or bankruptcy. In order to examine whether these issues are responsible for our findings, we reestimate our results excluding all banks that do not provide data over the entire sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . This leaves us with a balanced panel of 946 bank year observations. Results remain unchanged for the balanced sample as shown in Table IX, columns 1/2.
Another potential concern is the acquisition of banks during the sample period. When bank A acquires another bank B, we see an increase in lending by bank A. However, we do not document a similar decrease for bank B as it simply disappears from our sample. This survivorship issue might create a bias towards finding a positive effect of a legal change on bank lending. To address this problem, we exclude all banks that were involved in merger and acquisitions of other banks (so we exclude both the bank taken over as well as the 19 The subsequent sample adjustments were also conducted for specification 2. The coefficient of the interaction term between the legal indicator and the foreign ownership dummy remained unaffected. Results are available from the authors upon request. acquiring bank). 20 As shown in Table IX , columns 3/4, results are only slightly affected by this correction of survivorship bias.
A possible concern with our analysis is that results could be caused by factors other than changes in the law. Thus, it is important to examine other events that took place during our sample period that might drive our results. In general, such events should be controlled for by the chosen methodology, unless they are correlated with our legal indicators. Several countries in our sample underwent a banking crisis or restructuring during transition from a command to a market economy. Bulgaria had a banking crisis from 1995 to 1997, experiencing a bank run in 1996. 21 But the banking sectors in Latvia (1995 Latvia ( -1997 , Slovakia (1996 Slovakia ( -2000 , and Ukraine (1997-1998) also experienced considerable solvency problems. Croatia (1996 ), Czech Republic (1995 -1997 , Lithuania (1995 Lithuania ( -1996 , and Romania (1998) (1999) had bank restructuring in the periods given in parentheses. To control for these events, we remove all observations related to these events (we also exclude the year after each crisis/restructuring period). Our results are robust to this sample adjustment (Table IX, columns 5/6).
A considerable fraction of banking assets have been privatized during our sample period (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2005). A possible concern resulting from this observation is that the previously observed increases in bank lending are caused through efficiency gains from bank privatization instead of improvements in the legal system. Furthermore, a considerable fraction of government banks were privatized by being sold to foreign banks.
An inflow of foreign capital as a consequence of foreign banking privatization might also explain increases in lending. In order to address these concerns, we reestimate our main specifications, excluding banks that were privatized during our sample period. In Table IX, columns 7/8, all banks that gained a foreign owner during our sample period, both through privatization or take-overs, as well as banks that were domestically privatized are excluded from our sample. All prior stated results are robust to this sample adjustment. It is worth 20 Most bank take-overs and mergers during our sample period occurred in the Czech Republic and Poland. In most countries there were state-initiated merger waves of government banks before privatization in the beginning of the nineties (before our sample period).
21 See Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) for a summary on banking crises and bank failures in transition periods.
noting that banking privatization had a considerable effect on total banking assets since banks being privatized were generally large in size. However, the number of banks being privatized during our sample period is relatively small in comparison to our overall sample
size. Finally, we analyze whether the dates of bank privatization are clustered around the dates of legal changes. We find that banking privatization seems to be a continuous process with mostly only one or two banks being privatized at each given year in each country.
Further, we aim at controlling for other reforms in the CEE transition economies, that potentially drive our results. We include the indicators derived by Campos and Horvath (2006) for external, internal liberalization and privatization. As presented in columns 9/10, only the internal liberalization indicator enters our specification significantly. Overall, these control variables have only a marginal effect on our indicators. Another possible concern is that our findings are driven by foreign banking penetration due to the abolition of entrance barriers for banks. The countries in our sample started off as closed economies, but quickly liberalized entry to their domestic markets for foreign institutions. To control for this, we include a variable that aims at measuring changes in the conditions of foreign banks that was constructed by Giannetti and Ongena (2007) based on the Bekaert and Harvey (2004) database. 22 This variable identifies significant foreign bank related events and codes the improvement/worsening of conditions for foreign banks in our sample countries. Our presented results are robust to these changes (see columns 11/12).
We further include measures of legal enforcement (i.e. the Rule of Law index provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003) in order to account for possible differences in law enforcement in our sample countries. This Rule of Law index does not enter significantly in our regressions, while the coefficients of our other legal indicators remain unaffected. Most countries in our sample had only one change in Collateral and/or Bankruptcy. Therefore we can also construct these two indicators as a one/zero dummy variable. Applying these alternative indicators as our legal variables supports previous findings. Improvements in 22 We thank the referee for suggesting this control variable.
collateral law have a positive significant effect on bank lending, while the coefficient of the bankruptcy dummy indicator is statistically insignificant. 23
Conclusion
This paper attempts to improve our understanding of how law affects lending by focusing on legal changes in twelve transition economies. This allows us to deal with endogeneity concerns that have plagued previous research. Using bank level data and a DID methodology, we find that formal legal change does indeed promote lending by banks.
We also show that a collateral regime is of greater importance for lenders than a bankruptcy regime. The collateral regime, however, has been vastly ignored in empirical work. This paper suggests that it may play a very important role, especially for emerging and transition economies where information asymmetries tend to be a greater concern. We would like to stress here that our results do not imply that a bankruptcy regime is not important. Rather, what our results do indicate is that the efficacy of the bankruptcy regime is conditional on the existence of a strong collateral regime.
Further, we document that entrants, in particular foreign banks, benefit more from legal change by expanding their lending volume to a greater extent than incumbent domestic banks. This paper thus sheds new light on the causal nexus between banks, lending, and the law. 
In all regressions the dependent variable is the logarithm of loans.
Variables are defined as in Table I and legal indicators are defined as in Table II In columns 9 through 12 the sample is split up as follows: in columns 9/10 we divide the sample based on whether Collateral was above or below the mean ('good' or 'bad') at the time the bankruptcy reform was done; in columns 11 and 12 countries we divide the sample based on whether Bankruptcy was above or below the mean ('good' or 'bad') at the time the collateral reform was done. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are block bootstrapped by clusters of their country of operation. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1)
(8)
(10) Table VIII Multinational banks
Notes: The table shows regression results from estimating specification y st = α t + α k + α j + γ · X it + δ · CreditorRights jt−1 + ε st . In all regressions the dependent variable is the logarithm of loans. Variables are defined as in Table I and legal indicators are defined as in Table  II . Loans jt(−i) is the mean value of loan supply in each country and each year of all other bank besides the multinational bank itself. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are block bootstrapped by clusters of their country of operation. The regressions were run for 534 subsidiary year observations of 27 multinational banks for the years 1995 to 2002. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables are defined as in Table I and legal indicators are defined in Table II . In columns 1/2 we exclude observations from banks that do not report continuously financial statement information during our sample period from 1995 to 2002. In columns 3/4 all banks that were involved in merger and acquisitions of other banks as well as banks that were acquired by other banks during our sample period were excluded. In columns 5/6 all observations related to crisis and bank restructuring periods (as well as the year after each crisis/restructuring period) were excluded. In columns 7/8 all banks that gained a foreign owner during our sample period, both through privatization or take-overs, as well as banks that were domestically privatized are excluded from the sample. In columns 9/10 control indicators that proxy for differences in external, internal liberalization and privatization for our sample countries as derived by Campos and Horvath (2006) are included in the main specification. In columns 11/12 a control variable measuring changes in the conditions of foreign banks that was constructed by Giannetti and Ongena (2007) based on the Bekaert and Harvey (2004) database is included in the regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are block bootstrapped by clusters of their country of operation. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(8) Appendix B. Composition of loan portfolio and firm level evidence Table I Lending ratios and legal change
Notes: This table reports changes in the composition of banks' loan portfolios on a aggregated country level. Aggregate loans that are granted to corporations (enter), households/individuals (indi) and government (gov) were collected through the respective national central banks and finance ministries for our sample countries. The table reports the coefficient δ from the following specification (LendingCategory) j,t,k = α j,k + β j,t + γX j,t,k + δLegal j,t,k + ε j,t,k . In this specification the dependent variable is the logarithm of loans in each country j that is allocated to each of the different sectors k namely the enterprise, household and government sectors in a given year t. Country and year fixed effects are indicated by α j and β t , respectively. Further, GDP, the inflation rate and the interest rate spread (difference between lending and deposit rate) that are summarized by X it are included as control variables. Each equation is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by country of operation. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table II The effect of legal change on debt and debt structure ε it , where i indexes for firm, j for country and t for year. The dependent variable is the logarithm of debt in columns 1 through 5 and the debt structure (log of debt to assets ratio) in columns 6 to 10. Firm and year fixed effects are denoted as α i and β t , respectively. The specification includes size (log(sales)) and tangibility ( f ixedassets/assets), which is summarized by X it as control variables. The dummy variable Size takes the value of one if a firm belongs to the largest 25 percent of all firms before the respective legal change in each country (based on total assets) and zero if it belongs to the smallest 25 percent of firms. In all regressions including interaction terms, the variables included in the interaction term are also included in levels. The firm level data is obtained from the Bureau van Dyck Amadeus database. We exclude firms that belong to the public utilities as well as firms that do not report total assets and debt from the analysis. The sample comprises 49,410 firm year observations of 15,770 firms for the twelve sample countries from 1995 to 2002. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are block bootstrapped by clusters of their country of operation. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(8) 
